Senior pro-Taliban cleric assassinated in Pakistan

ISKP suspected to be behind killing of Jamia Haqqania’s head, Hamid-ul-Haq.

On 28 February 2025, Mawlana Hamid-ul-Haq Haqqani, a prominent Pakistani religious and political leader, was killed in a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED) attack. Following Friday prayers, Mawlana Hamid-ul-Haq Haqqani was exiting the mosque when he was attacked resulting in his death along with six other individuals.

According to Mawlana Abdul Haq Thani, Hamid-ul-Haq’s son and his successor, Hamid-ul-Haq was accompanied by his sons and other family members as they exited the mosque through a side door and descended the stairs towards their residence. In a video interview, Thani stated that the distance between the mosque and their residence was only a few meters. As per routine, supporters approached Hamid-ul-Haq for handshakes, at which point, the PBIED attacker, part of the crowd, detonated the explosive device.

Following the attack, the Ambassador of Iran to Pakistan, accompanied by an official delegation, visited Jamia Haqqania to offer condolences on 2 March 2025. Sardar Ahmad Shakeeb, the Ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan, along with a delegation of diplomats, including Peshawar’s Consul General, Hafiz Mohibullah, also visited Jamia Haqqania on behalf of the Taliban de facto authorities on 4 March 2025.

Hamid-ul-Haq served as the head of Jamia Haqqania Akora Khattak, located around 100 km from the Afghan border in north-west Pakistan. It is one of the most influential religious seminaries in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, affiliated with the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. Several senior leaders and members of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are alumni, and the groups have fostered a longstanding relationship with the institution.

A prominent alumna among Afghan Taliban was the founder of Haqqani network, Mawlana Jalaluddin Haqqani. Following his graduation from Jamia Haqqania, Jalaluddin Haqqani briefly served as a teacher at the seminary. However, due to the emergence of armed Islamist resistance against the then-government in Afghanistan in early 1970s, he abandoned teaching and returned to his home region to lead an armed insurgency. He chose the surname “Haqqani” due to his affiliation with Jamia Haqqania, a name that later became synonymous with the Haqqani Network, the militant group he founded and led.

Hamid ul-Haq was also the president of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq faction or JUI-S), a prominent Deobandi political party in Pakistan. He had previously served as a Member of Parliament in Pakistan parliament from 2002 to 2007, and his father, Mawlana Sami-ul-Haq, was appointed as official representative of TTP during peace negotiations with the Pakistani government in 2014, prior to his assassination in an unclaimed knife attack in Islamabad in 2018.

According to media reports, at the time of his assassination, Hamid-ul-Haq was reportedly preparing to travel to Kabul as part of a provincial government delegation for negotiations with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Hamid-ul-Haq previously visited Afghanistan, accompanied by other religious leaders, with the aim of mitigating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan and assisting in negotiations regarding TTP.

Claims of ISKP involvement in the assassination of Hamid-ul-Haq Haqqani

While no group has officially claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, ISKP involvement is widely suspected. TTP, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwat-ul-Hind (Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, HGB) issued statements strongly condemning the assassination, on 28 February 2025 (TTP and AQIS) and 1 March 2025 (HGB). AQIS attributed responsibility for the attack to ISKP, alleging that the group carried out the operation on behalf of Pakistan’s security agencies. Similarly, TTP accused Pakistan’s intelligence agencies of orchestrating the incident.

Although it is highly likely that ISKP were involved in the incident, there are a number of reasons why ISKP may have not publicly claimed the attack killing Hamid-ul-Haq. Notably, a concern over potential backlash from Deobandi circles: as a prominent Deobandi leader, Hamid-ul-Haq’s assassination could have been perceived as an act of sectarian aggression, potentially escalating hostility between Deobandis and Salafis.

While not all Salafis support ISKP, and the group itself does not claim to exclusively represent Salafism, nearly all of ISKP’s leadership belong to the Salafi school of thought, with the majority of them originating from the Salafis seminaries of Peshawar. Publicly acknowledging responsibility for the attack could have provoked anti-Salafi sentiment among Deobandi groups, leading to increased hostility towards Salafi scholars and seminaries.

While ISKP may, in the long term, seek to deepen sectarian divisions, an immediate rift between Salafis and Deobandis could have undermined its strategic objectives, particularly by reducing Salafi support and recruitment opportunities.

ISKP involvement in unclaimed attacks against religious scholars and Taliban allies

ISKP is suspected of similar unclaimed attacks targeting prominent religious scholars in the region. For instance, in October 2020, Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani, a senior Afghan Taliban religious leader, and a staunch opponent of ISKP, was believed to have been the target of an IED attack inside his madrasa Jamia Zubairia in Peshawar, Pakistan. While Rahimullah was not killed in the attack, the explosion resulted in over 100 casualties among students at the madrasa.

It is likely that ISKP did not claim the attack due to its failure in killing its intended target. Later, in August 2022, Rahimullah Haqqani was killed in Kabul inside his madrasa Jamia Riaz al-Uloom in a PBIED attack that was later claimed by ISKP.

In January 2022, Sheikh Abdul Hamid Rehmati, a renowned Salafi religious scholar and opponent of ISKP ideology, was assassinated in a firearms attack in Peshawar by unidentified assailants on motorcycles. ISKP was believed to be behind the killing of the scholar.

Following the beginning of current Taliban control of Afghanistan in August 2021, ISKP had issued strong criticism of the Salafi leaders in the Peshawar region who had openly rejected ISKP ideology. However, it is likely that ISKP did not openly claim responsibility for Rehmati’s assassination, owing to his position as a highly respected scholar known for his expertise in Salafi religious doctrine, and his significant influence among Salafi circles. A public statement of responsibility may have alienated potential support for ISKP among Salafi followers.

Despite not formally acknowledging responsibility for assassination attempts targeting religious scholars, such attacks nonetheless align with the group’s strategic objectives, in both eliminating and intimidating ISKP opponents, making it clear that opposition to ISKP results in severe consequences.

Remarks

Although unclaimed, the assassination of Hamid-ul-Haq is highly likely to have been carried out by ISKP as opponents of the Taliban. ISKP anti-Taliban propaganda, alongside criticism of the Taliban leadership, frequently targets Pakistan’s Deobandi religious scholars, including elements of its leadership such as Jamia Haqqania, whom ISKP perceives as ideological mentors and supporters of the Taliban.

Jamia Haqqania has historically maintained a close and influential relationship with the Afghan Taliban. Several key Taliban figures, including Mawlana Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani Network, and Zabihullah Mujahid, the current spokesperson of the Taliban, along with multiple senior leaders and cabinet members, are alumni of the institution. As a result of this deep-rooted association, Hamid-ul-Haq and his family were highly regarded and respected within the Afghan Taliban leadership.

The attack also potentially marks a significant escalation in ISKP’s ongoing conflict with the Taliban and its allies. In recent years, ISKP has carried out multiple attacks against the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman faction) (JUI-F), allegedly for their support of the Afghan Taliban and in retaliation for the killing of ISKP members. The majority of such attacks have taken place in the Bajaur district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province and Balochistan Province, including the targeting of a JUI-F election rally in a PBIED attack killing 54 and wounding over 100 party members and leaders on 30 July 2023.

However, the assassination of Hamid-ul-Haq marks the first ISKP suspected attack targeting the JUI-S faction. Unlike JUI-F, JUI-S has not been publicly accused by ISKP for fighting against the group on behalf of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan or killing its members in Pakistan. However, Jamia Haqqania has frequently been a target of ISKP propaganda and criticism, primarily due to its historical role as an educational institution for many senior Taliban leaders.