Extradition of ‘Abbey Gate planner’ from Pakistan to US sparks backlash

Critics accuse Islamabad of inflating the arrested ISKP member’s role for strategic gain.

In an address to the US Senate on 5 March 2025, President Donald Trump made a major announcement regarding the arrest in Pakistan of ‘Shareefullah’ [also known as ‘Jafar’], an ISKP operative reportedly linked to the August 2021 attack on US forces at Kabul Airport. Thanking Pakistan for its cooperation, President Trump praised the arrest as a major success. His remarks, however, elicited mixed reactions across the political landscapes of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On the same day, in reporting on the statement, Pakistan-based media widely amplified President Trump’s remarks, portraying them as a major diplomatic victory for the country.

Leading the celebratory coverage were pro-Pakistan government commentators and digital media outlets aligned with the security establishment. Framing Trump’s statement as a turning point in US-Pakistan relations, they suggested that the move signalled a shift away from the previously anticipated hardline policies, which had been shaped by Trump’s critical stance towards Pakistan. Pakistani analysts and commentators emphasised that Pakistan’s cooperation in the operation could once again enable Pakistan to position itself as a key US ally in the fight against terrorism, echoing its role during the post-9/11 ‘War on Terror’ period.

In response, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted to his official X (formerly Twitter) an extended message thanking President Trump. In his statement, he framed the operation as the beginning of a renewed chapter in US-Pakistan counter-terrorism cooperation, declaring that Pakistan remains fully committed to the partnership through all necessary efforts and sacrifices.

Conversely, supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan (who have long been engaged in social media campaigns against Army Chief General Asim Munir Syed and the current government), alongside other prominent critics of the military establishment, sought to downplay the significance of the operation.

They labelled the arrest of Shareefullah a staged act orchestrated by Pakistan’s security agencies. Their narrative aimed to undermine the government’s portrayal of the arrest as an extraordinary step by Pakistan to assist the US, and a significant breakthrough in bilateral relations. These actors also issued veiled warnings to the US government, cautioning against being misled by such actions from Pakistani intelligence.

They accused Pakistani intelligence agencies of shielding militant elements and selectively handing them over to serve their strategic interests: for instance, Mirza Shahzad Akbar, a former adviser to Imran Khan, declared the development a part of Pakistan’s “double game”, asserting that the country continues to manage and manipulate militant groups behind the scenes, exposing them only when it suits their diplomatic or geopolitical objectives:

“The ISI [The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence] has long been accused of selectively cooperating with Washington while simultaneously maintaining ties with militant groups that align with its regional strategic objectives. From the covert sheltering of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad to the military’s periodic crackdowns on the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Islamabad has perfected the art of offering counterterrorism cooperation when it suits its own interests”.

Supporters of Khan appeared intent on downplaying the role of Pakistani security institutions in the operation. This seemed to be an effort to reassure the Pakistani public, particularly Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) workers, that the development was not significant enough to alter President Trump’s stance towards the Pakistani military or the current government.

During Trump’s campaign, some of his close confidants criticised Khan’s arrest, which many Khan supporters had interpreted as a sign that, if re-elected, Trump might push for Khan’s release or at least prioritise him in future US-Pakistan relations.

This belief was particularly strong within the Pakistani diaspora in the US, where a large segment of Khan’s supporters actively supported and participated in Trump’s election campaign. The possibility that this recent operation might lead to improved ties between Trump and Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly Army Chief General Asim Munir, appeared to unsettle them. In response, they launched a swift and coordinated pushback on social media, aiming to discredit Pakistan’s role and cast the entire operation as insignificant or manipulative.

Beyond Pakistan, significant responses also emerged from Afghanistan. Both the Afghan Taliban and opposition, including senior officials from the former democratic government, reacted critically to Pakistan’s role in Shareefullah’s arrest.

Rather than viewing the development as part of efforts to counter terrorism, they characterised it as another example of Pakistan’s “double game” with the U.S. They echoed the view that the operation pointed to a broader pattern in which Pakistani security institutions allegedly manipulate militant networks for strategic leverage, while presenting selective actions to the US as cooperation.

In an immediate response to the development, pro-Taliban outlet Al-Mirsad Media published an op-ed on 5 March 2025, disputing the significance of Shareefullah’s arrest. The piece claimed that Shareefullah had no major role in the August 2021 Kabul airport attack, describing him instead as a low-ranking ISKP member.

According to Al-Mirsad, Shareefullah only rose to the position of commander after the Taliban eliminated much of ISKP’s senior leadership following the beginning of their current control of Afghanistan in August 2021. His promotion, they argued, resulted from a depleted lower-tier cadre, leading to his appointment as head of the group’s security wing.

The op-ed further stated that Shareefullah had initially been arrested by the former Afghan government in 2019 but escaped from prison, alongside other detainees, following the fall of that administration. Al-Mirsad claimed that Taliban intelligence had been tracking Shareefullah and his network, and that, like many ISKP operatives, he had fled to Pakistan’s southern province of Balochistan to evade capture.

Al-Mirsad also released a video of Shareefullah from 2019, following his arrest by the former Afghan government. In the footage, he is seen admitting that he was merely a low-level member of ISKP, not a senior commander, a statement now being used to question Pakistan’s narrative around his arrest.

Interestingly, on 10 March 2025, statements published in US media quoting US intelligence officials seemed to support Al-Mirsad’s claim that Shareefullah did not play a significant role in the Kabul Airport attack. However, they also stated that he would remain in custody. This development was re-circulated by Taliban supporters and, notably, by Imran Khan’s supporters in Pakistan, who portrayed it as an embarrassment for the Pakistani government and military, accusing them of attempting to exaggerate Shareefullah’s role to strengthen ties to the US administrations.

Much in the same way as Al-Mirsad, Taliban members and their supporters also contributed to the campaign to downplay Shareefullah’s significance in the August 2021 Kabul attack. Accusing the Pakistani government of deception, they claimed that Islamabad had portrayed an ordinary ISKP member as a senior commander and “traded” him to the US.

Similarly, prominent figures from the Afghan opposition also criticised the Pakistani government’s role in Shareefullah’s arrest, describing it as part of a broader “double game” aimed at securing cooperation and favour from the United States.

Former Afghan intelligence chief Rahmatullah Nabil, in a post on X, alleged that Pakistan was using ISKP as a proxy force to exert pressure on the Taliban, while simultaneously leveraging the threat of ISKP to gain strategic benefits from the US under the guise of counter-terror cooperation. Nabil further accused Pakistan of providing safe havens for ISKP, not only in Balochistan, but also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Former Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh also commented on the arrest, calling it a “clever trick” by Pakistan’s ISI, and claiming that a minor incident had been turned into a major headline.

Also on 5 March 2025, Saleh’s think tank, the Afghanistan Green Trend, published a detailed report on the matter, alleging that after his involvement in the Kabul airport attack, Shareefullah fled to Pakistan in early September 2021. The report claimed that Pakistani authorities later “recycled” and utilised him as part of a calculated strategy.