Afghan Witness data shows ISKP attacks have decreased inside Afghanistan, but reports highlight an uptick in linked activities and arrests outside the country amid an intensifying multi-lingual online campaign that draws recruits from Central Asia.
Photo: press handout by the Government of Moscow Oblast/ Mosreg.ru (Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0)
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan more than three years ago, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has carried out a spate of major attacks in the country, posing a security challenge for the de facto authorities.
A regional branch – or ‘province’ – of the main Islamic State (IS) group, ISKP has attacked Hazara and Shia neighbourhoods, foreign nationals and embassies in Afghanistan. It has also regularly attacked the Taliban.
The group was responsible for the deadly Kabul airport suicide bombing in August 2021, which killed 170 civilians and 13 US soldiers as Western forces withdrew from the country amid the Taliban’s takeover. Most recently, in May this year, ISKP claimed responsibility for the killing of three Spanish tourists and three Afghans in Bamiyan province.
The Taliban have responded with frequent and well-communicated raids against alleged ISKP cells in Afghanistan, while at the same time downplaying the threat the group poses. Monitoring carried out by CIR’s Afghan Witness team shows that attacks carried out by the group have significantly slowed over the past year.
ISKP activity, and Taliban raids/operations against ISKP between January 2022 and August 2024.
But while activity has dropped off inside Afghanistan, security analysts are describing ISKP as one of the most potent factions of IS currently, with ambitions to carry out attacks beyond Afghanistan’s borders. In July this year, the UN monitoring group that tracks IS activities globally described growing threat levels in Europe and elsewhere from the Khorasan branch.
Expansion of translated content
Afghanistan’s geographic position has allowed ISKP to use the Central Asia region for recruitment, training and sometimes as a target for attacks – with the group launching rockets into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2022.
It has paid particular attention to the region in its propaganda campaigns, recognising the potential to reach new audiences, boost recruitment and establish a transnational network as its members within Afghanistan decline.
ISKP appeared to embrace a new strategy from June 2023 onwards, with Afghan Witness’ data revealing an expansion in translated content, including a notable uptick in Tajik and Uzbek outputs.
Graph showing distribution of ISKP propaganda pieces, by language, between July 2022 and August 2024.
The IS affiliate also launched a new Tajik-language magazine after the attack against Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March of this year, which killed 145 people and injured more than 500. While IS claimed responsibility for the attack, US agencies believe that ISKP was responsible.
Experts have previously estimated that Tajik recruits constitute more than half of ISKP’s several thousand soldiers. As well as the Moscow attack, Tajik members of IS have been linked to attacks in Iran and Turkey this year.
The propaganda content directed at Central Asia often attempts to exploit common grievances and pre-existing tensions, highlighting regional states’ perceived anti-Muslim policies, human rights records, and economic struggles.
In its online communication, ISKP recently criticised a ban on wearing the hijab in Tajikistan. The group also claimed that poor governance has led to unemployment and an increase in migrant workers travelling to Russia.
It is estimated that there are about 1.3 million Tajik labourers in Russia, many of whom face isolation, low wages and discrimination, making some vulnerable to recruitment.
Arrests and foiled attacks in Europe
The deadly attack in Moscow highlighted a new transnational threat of attacks – prompting several European nations to move to their highest level of alerts.
At the same time, Afghan Witness observed an increase in online content on channels sympathetic to ISKP threatening European cities and major sporting events. Al-Azaim, ISKP’s main propaganda outlet, disseminated an image threatening attacks on Western countries, with Paris, Rome, Madrid and London depicted in the visual.
Following the Moscow attack, Al-Azaim disseminated an image (in collaboration with pro-IS outlet Al-Battar) threatening attacks on European cities.
This online campaign coincided with multiple arrests, attacks and foiled attacks – with reported links to ISKP – across Europe, Central Asia and North America, with Afghan Witness recording around 40 such incidents since April 2022.
Around a third of the incidents logged happened this year, and include the foiled plot to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna in July, as well as multiple arrests of individuals plotting to attack the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris.
Experts have frequently expressed concern about the growing potency of ISKP’s online campaign, as well as the vulnerability of young people consuming extremist content on platforms such as TikTok. A recent academic study found that nearly two-thirds of IS-linked arrests in Europe in the last nine months have been of teenagers.
Afghan Witness recently collaborated with Sky News on the data contained in this article. Read their coverage here. Be first to read our new reports. Sign up for email alerts.
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