Increase in the number of Shahed and Geran drone attacks against Kyiv

This report includes links to footage of damaged civilian infrastructure

Starting in the last week of October, CIR observed a growing number of videos of Russian Shahed and Geran One Way Attack (OWA) drones flying at extremely low altitudes over Ukraine, in particular over the capital city, Kyiv. CIR assesses that the recent increase in numbers of drones being launched at Ukraine may be an attempt to deplete Ukraine’s air defence stocks. Additionally, Russia’s last large-scale missile strike against Ukraine occurred in August 2024 and CIR assesses that Russia has possibly been building up their missile stocks for a renewed campaign over the winter period.

Incident verification and analysis

Figure 1: Map showing locations verified by CIR of damage to residential buildings likely caused by Shahed drones (red), footage of Shahed drones in flight (blue) and likely Shahed debris (green) across Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast.

Since 15 October 2024, CIR has observed that air alerts, including the use of Shaheds in Kyiv, have been occurring almost daily. In addition to this, CIR has verified a new trend of low-flying OWA drones over Kyiv, with the drones passing close to the top of high-rise apartment buildings, likely in an attempt to evade Ukrainian air defence systems in the city. In addition to increased drone activity over Kyiv, CIR has observed large, low-flying drone swarms during daylight hours elsewhere in Ukraine, such as Sumy, Cherkasy, and Poltava Oblast. Drones have also been regularly used in night strikes in Odesa. These methods of low-flying drones and saturation of air defence appear to be at least partially successful as one of the videos from Kyiv verified by CIR showed what appeared to be a surface-to-air missile narrowly missing a drone as it flew overhead.

Figure 2: User generated content images of low flying Shahed OWA drones over Cherkasy (top left), Poltava (top right), Kyiv (bottom left), and Sumy (bottom right).

This new trend of increased drone use brings with it increased risk to the civilian population, especially those living in high-rise apartment buildings. Whilst these drones are likely not targeting residential buildings, CIR has verified four incidents since 25 October 2024 of damaged residential buildings in Kyiv city including one video showing a direct impact by an OWA drone (Figure 3); according to Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margus Tsahkna, this building is where the Estonian Ambassador to Ukraine, Annely Kolk, lives. It was not immediately clear if the other damaged buildings were directly impacted by a drone or damaged by debris. CIR verified likely Shahed drone debris at two locations in Kyiv: outside the damaged Shevchenko University student dormitory on 3 November and at a heavily damaged medical facility on 7 November (see Figure 4).

Figure 3: Geolocation of UGC of an OWA drone impact on a high-rise residential building in Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast on 7 November 2024. [50.434420, 30.531925]

Figure 4: CIR verified likely Shahed drone debris at two locations in Kyiv: outside the Shevchenko University student dormitory on 3 November, bottom (50.470691, 30.465578) and at a damaged medical facility on 7 November, top (50.429733, 30.488594).

CIR observed a sharp increase in the reported number of OWA drones used in Russian attacks across Ukraine, starting in September. The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) reported that a total of 785 Shahed variant drones were launched towards Ukraine throughout August, with 1,339 in September, and 1,930 in October. Additionally, the Ukrainian Air Force has already reported 543 Shahed variant drones in the first week of November. This is the second highest number reported in any week since August 2024, exceeded only by the week of 15 to 21 October, which saw 607 launches.

Figure 5: Graph showing the increasing number of Ukrainian Air Force reported ‘Shahed’ OWA drones throughout the second half of 2024.

CIR assesses that these increased drone attacks have additional benefits for Russia on top of the primary goal of striking Ukrainian military targets.

Firstly, Russia has been using Shahed drones for reconnaissance with cameras installed instead of explosive payloads,11 according to Andrii Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD). CIR has also observed footage allegedly filmed from a Shahed drone passing over Ukrainian territory but cannot verify its authenticity. Whilst this development isn’t new and was reported as early as March 2024, the practice may be becoming more prevalent. Using Shahed drones for reconnaissance could also explain the increase in daylight drone raids when Russia has traditionally used Shaheds to attack at night.

CIR assesses that the recent increase in numbers of drones being launched at Ukraine may also be an attempt to deplete Ukraine’s air defence stocks, increasing the probability of subsequent successful strikes from Russia.

Additionally, Russia’s last large-scale missile strike against Ukraine occurred in August 2024 and CIR assesses that Russia has possibly been building up their missile stocks for a renewed campaign over the winter period. CIR previously verified large-scale Russian targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure between October and December 2022 and also in March 2024. Ukraine’s energy deficit over winter 2024/25 could reach as much as 6 Gigawatts (GW), which is the same as Denmark’s peak energy demand, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Further Russian attacks against energy infrastructure would highly likely increase this deficit, leading to further risk of civilian harm across Ukraine.