In her new book, CIR’s Alona Shestopalova explores how hostile rhetoric on Russian state-controlled TV tried to lay the foundation for widespread acceptance of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Below she provides an overview of her research.
Photo: Vladimir Putin’s interview for TASS News Agency/ Kremlin.ru, February 2020. (Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0)
Several months before Russia’s occupation of Crimea and nearly a decade before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine began on television screens. State-controlled media such as Channel One Russia and RT (formerly Russia Today) began a campaign to demonise and dehumanise Ukraine and Ukrainians. Already in 2014, Ukraine was painted as Russia’s main enemy – even more so than the West or NATO.
Earlier research shows that the dehumanisation of an enemy can cause a moral shift, making violence against it appear as a duty. Dehumanisation was widely used on Russian state-controlled TV. By framing events in Ukraine through the lens of the Russian regime, positioning Ukraine as seemingly and increasingly threatening, Russian TV gradually prepared the population for what followed.
From the onset of the Ukrainian pro-EU protests – known as Euromaidan – which began in November 2013, Russian state-controlled media adopted increasingly hostile rhetoric. My analysis reveals how within just a few months, Russian TV’s portrayal of Ukrainians shifted from drug addicts and misfits to killers of Russian speakers and crucifiers of children – perhaps the most infamous example being the widely reported fake story about a boy allegedly crucified by Ukrainian soldiers in Sloviansk, first broadcast by Channel One Russia. The shift in media rhetoric between November 2013 and September 2014 represents a catalytic change in the portrayal of Ukraine and Ukrainians on Russian state-controlled TV. No post-2014 change was as dramatic.
The most common narrative pushed on Russian TV was based on false claims that Nazis came to power in Ukraine as a result of the Euromaidan. The comparisons of post-Maidan Ukraine, the Ukrainian army and particular Ukrainian politicians with the Third Reich, Wehrmacht, and Adolf Hitler’s comrades respectively were often heard on Russian TV.
By portraying Ukrainian leaders as Nazis and fascists, Russian media tapped into historical fears and traumas, attempting to evoke an emotional response from their audiences. It was a portrayal that was not only misleading but also dangerous, as it laid the groundwork for justifying Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with ‘denazification’ stated as a goal. It also helped to justify the systematic attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, schools and hospitals and the torture of Ukrainian civilians that followed. Whenever international attention focused on a specific Russian attack, state-controlled media would often swiftly divert the narrative, blaming Ukraine for incidents such as the downing of MH17 in July 2014 or the attack on the Okhmadyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv in July 2024 — despite Russian missiles being responsible for both tragedies.
By March 2014, the Russian public was already willing to accept some level of aggression against Ukraine and even support it. According to Russia’s leading independent polling agency Levada, eight out of 10 Russians endorsed the occupation of Crimea, and Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings surged after the occupation. Nearly ten years later, in March 2023, CIR identified an increase in the use of national slurs and hate speech against Ukrainians on both X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram, including incitements to kill Ukrainians in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, illustrating just how widespread this rhetoric had become.
While Russia’s primary focus has been on shaping domestic opinion, my research has found that the impact of state-controlled communication against Ukraine extends beyond Russia’s borders. Russian efforts abroad have also been tailored to resonate with the specific traumas and fears of different international audiences, whether through claims of deep-seated associations with terrorism and Nazism, or concerns about cold homes due to a lack of Russian gas.
Russia’s president frequently references the events of 2014 in his speeches, including those made since the full-scale invasion. The hostile state-controlled communication about the events of 2014 provided a variety of false justifications for why the Russian army had no choice but to attack Ukraine, establishing a framework that shapes how millions of Russians and pro-Russian individuals around the world interpret the ongoing war.
Dr Alona Shestopalova joined CIR in 2022 where she works on the Eyes on Russia project. Before joining CIR, Alona wrote a doctoral dissertation about hostile rhetoric on Russian state-controlled TV. Find out more about her new book From Screens to Battlefields: Tracing the Construction of Enemies on Russian Television here.
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