What if people stopped filming conflicts?

On 2 October 2024, a media centre associated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) instructed their soldiers on X to stop filming events and “assisting the enemy”. Days later, an account affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shared a video asking soldiers to stop filming their equipment or provisions, even when provoked. On 10 October, RSF head Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”, called on commanders, commissioned officers and fighters to stop filming their plans, movements and equipment entirely.

In recent years, open source research has proven instrumental in exposing human rights violations and corroborating traditional journalism. It has even been said that open source has democratised access to information, with videos and photographs posted online providing crucial visual data for investigators, journalists and researchers to analyse and report upon. 

The recent instances of soldiers being told to stop filming themselves in Sudan potentially threaten ongoing open source research in the country. Similar calls for people to stop posting user-generated content (UGC) have been recorded elsewhere, including since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. 

While many in the open source community have explored the challenges facing open source researchers, including AI, few have questioned this increasingly observable trend: what if people were to stop filming conflicts?

Drawing upon interviews with CIR investigators who research different countries and contexts, this article will explore potential reasons for observed declines in UGC as well as the consequences, considering whether the trend poses a serious threat to open source analysis or instead, an opportunity for investigators – and the field – to adapt and address emerging challenges.

A clamp down on filming

Chief amongst the reasons for declining UGC are concerns over operational security (OPSEC) and growing awareness of accountability investigations. Since the calls for soldiers to stop filming in Sudan in early October 2024, Mohamed*, an open source analyst for CIR’s Sudan Witness project, noticed a drop-off in footage posted online by both the SAF and RSF. 

In the case of the SAF, Mohamed attributes this to tightened security in the wake of their late-September offensive, whilst the RSF’s (who he says rarely post their positions online) order was more likely an attempt to avoid further backlash against their committing of human rights violations that were exposed by recent investigations. 

This reasoning was based on Hemedti’s speech from 10 October 2024, where he announced that the filming of prisoner interrogations was to be prohibited, stating “[I don’t want to see] anyone interrogating prisoners and filming it … The killing of prisoners is [also] prohibited. Because of this, I’m saying to you filming is prohibited, prisoners are a red line.”

This decline in UGC is not insignificant. Sudan Witness relies on footage from perpetrators showing their positions or what they have damaged, as Sudanese civilians rarely post footage of the conflict online due to fear of persecution, as well as restricted internet access and frequent signal blackouts.

Rollo Collins, an investigator on CIR’s Eyes on Russia project says that since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, open source research’s shift into the mainstream “has led people to fully understand the power of UGC to help locate events and track military movements”.

Like Mohamed, he has observed similar instructions ordering soldiers to stop filming themselves. Collins recalls how during Russia’s energy infrastructure campaign in October 2022, Ukraine feared that Russia would be able to correct firing positions or strikes using civilian documentation of damage and called for a reduction in UGC. While it became more difficult for the Russian military to track Ukrainian troop movement, for the Eyes on Russia team, it also meant less UGC to analyse and a heavier reliance on satellite imagery. 

It also meant that Russian forces could make false claims about Ukrainian positions and investigators could provide less footage to contradict them. Collins adds that Russian civilians also share concerns about soldiers posting UGC online, and often criticise them on Telegram channels for revealing Russian military movements, particularly in border areas like Belgorod, Kursk and Rostov.

As Head of Open Source on CIR’s Afghan Witness and Eyes on Russia projects, Benjamin den Braber has monitored trends in UGC across multiple conflicts. In Afghanistan, Den Braber explains that growing awareness of accountability investigations has caused a noticeable decline in UGC. Even posting the findings of digital investigations online can encourage certain actors to self-censor or implement restrictions. 

He refers specifically to the response to Afghan Witness’ investigation into prisoner executions in the Panjshir Valley – where the team conclusively linked one group of Taliban fighters to the execution of ten men in September 2022. Den Braber says that following the scrutiny the Taliban received, team members noticed a decline in the amount of footage emerging online. “Whether related to the success of the Panjshir investigation or not, Afghan Witness has not seen a case as big since,” he adds. 

Disinformation and propaganda

A reduction in footage being posted online would initially mean reduced real-time reporting, which could make it harder to verify incidents. Den Braber says that this could allow for more inauthentic or manipulated footage to emerge in its place, as “people could start resharing old content and putting out wild claims, which would be much harder to disprove without verified footage to compare to”.

Conflict monitoring units would therefore need to rely more on traditional sources such as public records and on-the-ground news reporting. This could be challenging in conflict zones such as Sudan where the press is restricted, and where bias and censorship are widespread. 

Mohamed agrees, pointing out that “less organic content posted by RSF soldiers makes it more difficult for investigators to verify events” and adding that this means “the RSF and SAF leaders get to control the narrative about incidents for propaganda purposes”.

Following the violence in Ardamata, a neighbourhood in the northeast of El Geneina, West Darfur, after the RSF took over the SAF 15th Infantry Division in early November 2023, RSF leadership and official accounts posted videos to show that life was “returning to normal” in El Geneina. The official RSF Telegram account posted a video of RSF and Arab tribal leaders’ “peaceful coexistence” event, and the pro-RSF Acting Governor of West Darfur posted a video of a clean-up of Ardamata market initiative. 

However, the picture painted by open source analysis revealed that the opposite was true. International organisations reported significant displacement and a lack of resources for those remaining, and satellite imagery showed that El Geneina had in fact suffered some of the most severe damage of any Sudanese city in the conflict, with almost 50% of the neighbourhoods burned, cleared and not rebuilt.

Greater reliance on geospatial imagery

With less content coming out of Ukraine since the start of the conflict, Collins says Eyes on Russia investigators have relied increasingly on satellite imagery and remote sensing tools – what he describes as a “neutral party which cannot be obscured by individual parties”. However, it also means that tracking infrastructure destruction has become more difficult. Free tools like SentinelHub are low resolution, while higher resolution satellite imagery like Planet and Maxar have less frequently updated imagery. 

Other investigators share similar views. Den Braber states that although remote sensing tools can be used to draw inferences, they are limited when it comes to identifying perpetrators and attributing responsibility. 

Mohamed also says that relying on satellite imagery alone leaves gaps.

He also recognises that a greater reliance on satellite imagery could impact the wider open source landscape. Organisations with access to more expensive remote sensing tools would have a greater responsibility to carry out investigations, whilst the volunteer open source community would be left without access to these tools to provide the geo- and chronolocations that many conflict monitoring organisations rely on.

Challenges could force innovation

A decline in UGC – such as when a state triggers an internet blackout or mandates a ban on filming – could result in decreased visibility of conflicts and incidents, with actors attempting to minimise the ways in which they can be operationally compromised through open source investigations. 

Investigators could find themselves increasingly turning to traditional news sources or satellite imagery, and a lack of footage from the ground could leave room for disinformation and false claims to thrive. It could potentially diminish the usefulness of open source research and lead to a greater reliance on more private, interventionist intelligence methods. 

However, open source methodologies have already triggered a shift away from the monopoly of traditional intelligence. A more optimistic assessment, which was made by some of the investigators we spoke to, is that the open source field is innovative enough to respond to such challenges. 

Collins reflects on how the Ukraine open source community has adapted effectively to using more satellite imagery for investigations since 2022: “It’s a more difficult, and more time-consuming process, but it won’t leave people less able to collect and verify information” he says.

Den Braber is also optimistic about using other techniques to replace UGC analysis, such as analysis of social media profiles to identify individuals online. While certain footage may be banned or restricted, people may still reveal information that is useful for investigations in more indirect ways, such as location-tagging, or sharing critical information in text posts. 

He recognises, however, that impacts are dependent on specific information environments. In contexts such as Ukraine, there “may not be a massive impact as there are still a lot of police and prosecutors investigating on the ground to be able to flag war crimes and help identify perpetrators”, he explains. In Afghanistan, the repercussions could be more severe, he says, as “often the only visibility is from UGC”, with open source investigators on the Afghan Witness project relying heavily on “content shared by journalists and others filming events”.

Ben Strick, Director of Investigations at CIR, points out that open source research can still reach remarkable conclusions using satellite imagery rather than UGC. He recalls the volunteer-led Ocelli project, which crowdsourced analysis of satellite images from 2016-2020 in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, where blocked internet and media access meant there was little coverage of the military’s treatment of the Rohingya. Coverage was primarily derived from satellite imagery to “show damage and add gravity to witness statements” Strick explains. Here, satellite imagery was an invaluable tool, as it revealed scores of burnt villages and attempts to erase the evidence through bulldozing. 

A less ‘human’ view of conflicts

Strick warns that a greater reliance on geospatial analysis could warp conflict reporting, however. Citizen-filmed videos can convey stark examples of on-the-ground suffering, so less of these could mean a decreased representation of the “human cost” of violent conflicts. 

“Satellite imagery takes on a more forensic role which lacks the human aspect and much-needed context that on-the-ground footage provides,” he explains. 

In countries such as Afghanistan, where restrictions on journalists mean that human rights are already difficult to monitor and report upon, a lack of UGC would further limit analysts and researchers. For example, there is limited footage of the public punishments that have been routinely announced by the Taliban but are tightly controlled, with only the occasional image taken at a distance emerging online. The cases are therefore almost impossible to visually verify, limiting Afghan Witness’ ability to expose cases.

Reason to panic?

It is worth pointing out that even in regions where self-censorship and press restrictions are widespread, videos filmed from the ground continue to emerge, shedding light on issues or incidents that might otherwise go unreported. These videos are often taken at great risk to the individual behind the camera, who could be punished or targeted if open source investigations then reveal their identity or location.

“I think there will always be instances of UGC because people film things when there is a risk to their life. People break rules on the internet all the time because they think they’re more anonymous than they are,” says Collins. 

It is also important to remember that it can be the perpetrator behind the camera. Part of wartime success includes maintaining a strong image and position of public favour. Posting footage of conflicts allows militaries to shape narratives that they are winning and deter counter-operations – strategies they are unlikely to drop.

Collins also believes that although UGC is less available than it was at the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Eyes on Russia can count on continued access to UGC from Ukraine and Russia because it serves propaganda and fundraising purposes, though all such sources undergo a stringent verification process. Larger institutions like the Russian Air Force communicate a narrative of success by posting “proof” of them “successfully liberating” areas on social media. For example, when Russian troops took Avdiivka and Bakhmut in 2023 and later Vuhledar in 2024, they posted photos showing them raising flags in city centres and near important buildings. 

Some Russian units exist outside the formalised structures of the Russian Armed Forces and often comprise mercenaries and volunteers. These units often require additional funding for equipment, so they film their successful operations to fundraise and gain grassroots support from home.  CIR observed this with the recent escalation of drone-dropped munitions in Kherson and its neighbouring suburb, Antonivka, with units filming and posting the incidents on pro-Russian Telegram channels. 

The external position of such units also makes them less likely to follow orders relating to operational security. They are also usually keen to boost morale by posting their successful operations online. As a result, while restrictions may be placed on Russian soldiers, more informal groups will likely continue posting critical information on the internet.

In the Sudanese conflict, Mohamed also doubts that fighters would comply with orders from above to stop posting videos. “There is still the element of ego and pride,” he explains.  

“People want to show off that they control things or own specific advanced weapons, so we’re going to have to bank on their ego to give us more videos and fuel our investigations.”

A shifting landscape

Declining levels of UGC have been observed to varying extents and contexts, from Sudan to Ukraine, Afghanistan to Myanmar. Such cases have challenged open source research, however, the investigators we spoke to largely agree that a decline in the documentation of conflicts would not be completely catastrophic for open source research. 

The field has proven to be flexible and innovative in the past and will adapt to new challenges again, remaining an important methodology for investigating human rights abuses and war crimes. With more social media users than ever before, the posting of graphic and violent content has become more normalised, and incentives for militaries to carry on posting UGC remain.

“Asking ‘what if people stopped filming conflicts?’ raises interesting questions for organisations like CIR. As we grow, we must consider how and why we share our work, and the wider impact it may have,” Strick says.  

“We recognise that greater awareness of open source research can pose risks to the continued posting of UGC, potentially impacting future investigations. Staying responsive to such developments is key.”

*CIR changed the name of this investigator.