

Centre for
Information
Resilience

Eyes on Russia

Report 7

5 May 2022



Eyes on Russia: Report 7

Background


The Centre for Information Resilience’s “Eyes on Russia” Project maps, documents, and verifies significant incidents related to Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Each week, CIR investigators collate, geolocate, and verify information appearing on social media and claims made by parties to the conflict. Our latest findings can always be found on this [Twitter thread](#).

CIR contextualizes these details amid the discourse and developments of the week. The footage and imagery is added to the [Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map](#), which policymakers, journalists, and other OSINT researchers can use to track the conflict. As part of this effort, CIR publishes biweekly written summaries of its research, detailing verified troop and equipment analysis, influence operation narratives, and broader updates. This is the seventh of such regular reports. The first report can be read [here](#).

The Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) is an independent, non-profit social enterprise dedicated to exposing human rights abuses, countering disinformation, and combating online behavior harmful to women and minorities.

We believe, at a time of heightened tension, that journalists and policymakers should have easy access to verified information. The Eyes on Russia Project will aim to empower its audiences with analysis and facts on which they can rely.

If you require further information, please do get in touch at hello@info-res.org.



1. Executive Summary

- Since 20 April, Russian forces have continued to heavily attack and target civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine. Some examples of geolocated footage by CIR investigators includes the following:
 - Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Odessa.
 - Heavy shelling of the Azovstal factory in Mariupol.
 - A mass grave 18km West of Mariupol.
- In the information sphere, CIR has noted wide scale efforts to spread disinformation about Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
 - Narratives were particularly focused on the recent developments in Moldova-Transnistria. Kremlin aligned social media channels have amplified social media posts suggesting that Ukraine is attempting to smuggle arms into Moldova-Transnistria amongst other narratives.
- CIR's Director of Investigations, Benjamin Strick, has written an in-depth report about the Russian occupation of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, and possible radiation contamination of Russian soldiers.
 - The report also contains geolocated imagery of Russian troop movements in and around the camp. The full report can be found [here](#).
- Important developments have taken place in Transnistria between 25 April to 29 April. Two radio transmission towers carrying Russian signals were destroyed, and an attack took place on the Ministry for State Security.
 - These events have been geolocated by CIR investigators below.

- CIR investigators have published two explainer reports about recent developments of Russia's invasion of Ukraine:

Russia's "International Public Tribunal on Ukraine: This explainer surveys the efforts of Russia to establish a tribunal that gathers information on the "crimes of Kyiv's regime." CIR investigators highlight the subjective nature of the panel, and its use as propaganda to further the Kremlin's agenda in Ukraine. The full explainer can be found [here](#).

The Anti-Ukraine Report Spreading on Telegram: This explainer surveys a report that circulated on Telegram in the days following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The report originates from a channel with suspected ties to Russian security services. The narrative of the report repeats Kremlin propaganda that has been widely used to justify the invasion of Ukraine. The full explainer can be found [here](#).

2. Noted Narratives

Since the 20th of April, CIR has continued to observe the promotion of Kremlin based conspiracy theories across social media platforms, with an attempt to spread disinformation online about the legitimacy and rationale behind its ongoing invasion and occupation of Ukraine.

Developments in the disinformation sphere have included the following:

- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is Not Fit to Serve**

A YouTube channel detected by CIR analysts has gained increasing popularity for amplifying conspiracy theories about Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky.

The channel is named “Eli Alkash” with a profile picture portraying a distorted image of former president Donald J. Trump.

The videos on the YouTube channel amplify various disinformation narratives about the war in Ukraine and President Zelensky. In a video that has gained over 60,000 views, Zelensky is portrayed as drunk and under the influence of cocaine as seen below.

The channel attempts to gain legitimacy by posting content about basketball, vlogs from around the world, and information on sports cars. However, these videos are interspersed with allegations that Ukraine is a Nazi State and that Zelensky is addicted to hard drugs.

The YouTube channel was established on 31 January 2021 and began to post intensively on 17 February in the days prior to Russia’s invasion.

The narratives that the channel amplifies coheres with the disinformation that CIR analysts have observed from the Kremlin and its aligned channels.




Figure 1: A screenshot taken on 3 May, of a video portraying President Volodymyr Zelensky as drunk and under the influence of hard drugs.¹

- **Ahead of Victory Day, Ukraine chooses to Commemorate Nazis Instead of the Fall of Fascism**

CIR analysts have identified new narratives around the upcoming celebration of Victory Day, which takes place in Russia and other territories in the post-Soviet space on 9 May to commemorate the 1945 surrender of Nazi Germany.

Traditionally, Victory Day has been an opportunity used by the Kremlin to spread propaganda and parade Russia's military prowess.

CIR analysts have identified emerging narratives that are using Victory Day to justify Russia's occupation of territories within Ukraine. These are a product of both inauthentic and organic social media activity².

A prominent narrative has emerged that the Russian occupation of territories like Melitopol has enabled war veterans to finally celebrate Victory Day.

¹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKxLlec3ukw&ab_channel=EliAlkash.

² <https://socialbearing.com/search/user/TorstenS15>.

This narrative supports the Kremlin’s aims to de-contextualize the occupation of Ukraine, framing it as a “liberation”. Additionally, it claims that celebrations of Victory Day were not previously not allowed in Ukraine³⁴.

Ukrainian WWII veteran gives Allies credit where it's due

📍 Melitopol. WWII veterans rejoice at the upcoming May 9 Victory Day parade - in the regime past, it was not allowed to wear your Soviet uniform proudly nor display the St. George ribbon.



10:01 pm · 2 May 2022 · Twitter for Android

Screw you Zelensky, screw you. Preparations for the Victory Day have begun in the center of Melitopol.



9:07 pm · 2 May 2022 · Twitter for Android

Figure 2: A screenshot taken on 2 May, of Twitter posts amplifying the pro-Kremlin narrative that Ukrainian World War II veterans in occupied Melitopol can finally celebrate Victory Day.

CIR has also identified social media accounts repurposing old content to strengthen the constantly evolving narrative of ‘Nazi Ukraine’.

Of note, videos from a demonstration held in Kyiv in 2020 to honor wartime partisan leader Stepan Bandera have been shared by some Twitter users⁵⁶.

The Twitter posts tried to prove that Ukraine has picked “the wrong side” – i.e., the Nazi side, honoring Nazi collaborators and ultranationalists instead of celebrating Victory Day⁷.

This narrative includes unproven claims that Zelensky also considers Bandera a national hero⁸.

³ https://twitter.com/GMitakides/status/1521233462115643396?s=20&t=zNqjsqPlqw8_N4VBxVPZ-g.

⁴ https://twitter.com/Sibiriachka_Ya/status/1520115886211973122?s=20&t=CWm9PVYmZb94ovy-dgBpOA.

⁵ https://twitter.com/WarKamikaze/status/1521395426670305281?s=20&t=zNqjsqPlqw8_N4VBxVPZ-g.

⁶ <https://twitter.com/mar2vad/status/1520025371701305347?s=20&t=CWm9PVYmZb94ovy-dgBpOA>.

⁷ https://twitter.com/TorstenS15/status/1521405044033269761?s=20&t=zNqjsqPlqw8_N4VBxVPZ-g.

⁸ https://twitter.com/TorstenS15/status/1521392213145669633?s=20&t=zNqjsqPlqw8_N4VBxVPZ-g.



Figure 3: A screenshot taken on 3 May, of a Twitter post claiming that “Nazi war criminals like Bandera” are role models for Ukraine.

Victory Day is not only deeply ingrained in Russia’s identity, but also has a symbolic significance for ethnic Russians based in former Soviet territories. As a result, influence operations targeting the celebrations in the immediate aftermath of this event could be expected to grow.

Narratives around tensions in Moldova-Transnistria

- **Attacks are taking place in Transnistria because it holds the largest arms depot in Europe**

In a Telegram post on 26 April⁹, Russian propagandist Vladimir Soloviev updated his followers about the recent incidents in Transnistria. Soloviev is a media personality in Russia and a long-standing supporter of Vladimir Putin and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In his post Soloviev claims “that attacks were taking place in the region because a large arms depot in Europe was stored in a village, Cobasna, in Transnistria.”

The post has gained over 550,000 thousand views in several hours, and Soloviev has over one million followers on his Telegram channel.



Для информации.

В 2 километрах от границы с Украиной, на территории ПМР, находится крупнейший в Европе склад боеприпасов. Располагается он в селе Колбасна. Охраной этого арсенала занимаются оперативная группа российских войск (ОГРВ), дислоцированная в Приднестровье, а также местные военные. По данным ряда экспертов, количества боеприпасов со склада в Приднестровье хватит на десятилетия войны.

👍 6840 🙌 1243 🔥 236 😬 101 🗨️ 75 🗑️ 26
👁️ 598.7K edited 9:09 AM

Figure 4: A screenshot taken on 26 April, of the post made by Vladimir Soloviev claiming that attacks are taking place in the region because Transnistria holds a large arms depot.

⁹ <https://t.me/SolovievLive/103133>.

This narrative around the arms depot has been observed elsewhere¹⁰; echoing Vladimir Soloviev, the Telegram post below claims that Cobasna contains one of the largest arms depots in Europe with enough armaments to last a decade of war, posing a significant danger to anyone who will attempt to attack it.




Figure 5: A screenshot taken on 26 April, of a post claiming that Transnistria contains a large-scale arms depot and anyone who wishes to attack the region should be aware.

This narrative has since been fuelled by a claim on 27 April from the pro-Russian administration in Transnistria alleging that shots were fired from the Ukrainian border near Cobasna.

Additionally, reports suggested that Ukrainian drones have been flying over Transnistria for months. The reports were circulating widely on Russian state media and Telegram¹¹.

¹⁰ <https://t.me/KpMoldova/43123>.

¹¹ <https://www.rt.com/russia/554596-transnistria-shots-fired-from-ukraine/>.

The claim was also picked up and repeated by Vitaly Kiselev, Assistant Minister of the Interior of the Luhansk People’s Republic, in an interview with Russian state media.




Figure 6: A screenshot taken on 29 April, of a Telegram post referencing a Ria Novosti interview with LPR official Vitaly Kiselev.¹²

¹² <https://ria.ru/20220428/pridnestrove-1785969544.html>.

The claim has spread widely on social media platforms in several languages. Google Search Trend data shows a significant spike in searches for 'Cobasna' in English, Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan.

Interestingly, the spike in English-language searches comes slightly later but tails off more slowly in comparison to the other languages. This likely reflects the time it took for the claims about Cobasna to percolate through the international information sphere. Translations and time zone differences might have also influenced the timeline of searches.




Figure 7: A screenshot taken on 30 April of Google Search Trend data.

- **The attacks in Transnistria lead back to Ukraine**

CIR analysts have investigated the proliferation of a narrative claiming that the alleged terrorist attack in Transnistria leads back to Ukraine¹³.

This narrative is linked to the broader efforts by the Kremlin to claim that Ukraine is filled with neo-Nazis, a reference that is made in the Telegram post below: “Krasnoselsky also called on Kyiv to investigate the penetration of Ukrainian militants to carry out attacks in the republic”. The Sputnik channel that made the Telegram post has over 170,000 subscribers.




Figure 8: A screenshot taken on 26 April, of a post made on Sputnik’s Moldova channel claiming that Ukrainian terrorists are responsible for attacks in Transnistria.

¹³ <https://t.me/sputniklive/36074>.

Additionally, CIR analysts have observed an emerging narrative on Telegram claiming that a weapons transfer from Ukraine was intercepted on the Moldovan border.

According to the narrative, Ukraine is attempting to support military action against the Russian backed Transnistrian region.

This narrative supports the Kremlin's efforts to portray Ukraine and its government as suppressing and attacking Russian speakers, heritage, and culture. Particularly, the Telegram post suggests that there are active efforts to destabilize the status quo in Transnistria.




Figure 9: A screenshot taken on 29 April, of a Telegram post suggesting that Ukraine is trying to smuggle arms into Moldova.¹⁴

¹⁴ <https://t.me/rusputnikmd/22893>.

- **Ukraine’s invasion of Transnistria is imminent**

On Twitter, CIR analysts have also identified the emergence of a narrative claiming that the invasion of Transnistria by Ukraine is imminent¹⁵.

This narrative gained strength after Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych stated on 27 April that Kremlin authorities were planning “a new front of war” in Moldova¹⁶.

Arestovych offered Ukraine’s help in case Russia tried to occupy Transnistria. Arestovych’s declarations were described by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as a “serious provocation” and portrayed by some Russian media¹⁷, such as newspaper Vedomosti, as a sign that Ukraine is ready to “capture” Transnistria¹⁸.




Figure 10: A screenshot taken on 27 April, of a Twitter post accusing Ukraine of the recent attacks in Moldova and claiming that the invasion of Transnistria is now imminent.

¹⁵ <https://twitter.com/UBERSOY1/status/1519347354746376192>.

¹⁶ https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-04-26-22/h_5bd367a0065e3b6adecb4e8b42383b27.

¹⁷ https://tass.com/world/1444051?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com.

¹⁸ <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2022/04/27/920000-v-ofise-zelenskogo-zayavili-o-gotovnosti-zahvatit>.

Some users have taken this narrative further, accusing Ukraine of creating online propaganda posters (labeled as “Ukrpropaganda”/ ”укрпропаганда”)¹⁹, allegedly created to gather support for Ukraine’s plans to “liberate Transnistria”.

This narrative is part of the Kremlin's broader efforts to deflect blame for the turmoil in the region and portray Ukraine as an invader, supported by the EU, NATO and, in the case of Transnistria, enabled by Chisinau²⁰²¹.



Figure 11: A screenshot taken on 27 April, of a tweet spreading false claims about Ukraine sharing propaganda and revealing their intentions to “liberate Transnistria”.

¹⁹ <https://twitter.com/KoTuBoT/status/1519436732294483970>.

²⁰ <https://twitter.com/RepblicaDemocr1/status/1519285352145559552?s=20&t=kqWpIZG61PUL58Zqwk5pWA>.

²¹ <https://twitter.com/OndrejDobrota/status/1519378731357380609>.

- **Invasion by Poland, Romania and/or NATO is imminent**

A second version of the 'invasion' narrative is that the strikes in Transnistria are a pre-cursor to an imminent invasion by NATO forces from Poland and Romania.

This narrative has been spreading in several different forms. Particularly in an article published on 26 April on the US-sanctioned Russian propaganda website SouthFront²².

The article claims that Poland in coalition with Moldova, intends to invade Transnistria under the guise of a humanitarian operation. According to the article, the aim is to move troops closer to Odessa.

SouthFront frames this as a plot between Kyiv and Washington to stretch Russian forces thin by opening a second front in Transnistria. The article claims this will take place from mid-late May or mid-late June.

Military clashes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with the Armed Forces of Poland and Romania on the territory of a non-member state of NATO is the perfect scenario for Kiev and Washington. In case of the opening of another front in the neighboring country, the AFU counter offensive should be expected in the south of Ukraine with active defense in the East.

This is the main scenario in the region which also follows the ongoing international political developments. The preparation and composition of the sixth package of EU sanctions are associated with the upcoming events in Transnistria.

The expected timing of the scenario is from May 12 to May 25, 2022, or from June 15 to June 25, depending on the actions and successes of the Russian Federation in the Donbass region.

Figure 12: A screenshot taken on 29 April of a SouthFront article describing the purported plans for a combined Polish-Romanian invasion of Transnistria.

²² <https://archive.ph/sWz9l>.

On 28 April this narrative received a degree of official support by Moscow's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) chief, Sergey Naryshkin. Naryshkin publicly claimed that Russian intelligence had evidence that Poland is planning to move troops into Ukraine under the guise of peacekeepers²³. This, according to Russian intelligence, would be part of a plot with the United States to carve up Ukraine and hand western Ukraine to Poland²⁴.

Naryshkin did not make a direct reference to Transnistria, but it seems very unlikely that the similarities between Naryshkin's comments and the narrative of a Polish-led invasion are coincidental.

This narrative was given further credence on 30 April. As a pro-Russian television channel in Transnistria aired claims that the car used by the alleged Ukrainian attackers in Transnistria had Polish license plates²⁵.

Polish authorities have pushed back on the claim, asserting that the license plate belongs to a different car, and denouncing the allegations as disinformation²⁶.

These Russian allegations come on the heels of repeated attempts to involve Transnistria in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the early weeks of Russia's invasion, Kremlin propaganda (including both state media and social media accounts) made repeated references to Moldova-Transnistria.

News coverage of the region included Moldova's position on Western sanctions and banning of the St George's ribbon and Z and V symbols²⁷.

²³ <https://www.rt.com/russia/554671-poland-ukraine-spy-split/>.

²⁴ <https://tass.com/politics/1444887>.

²⁵ <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zamachowcy-na-polskich-numerach-rosyjska-prowokacja-w-naddniestrzu-6763438657088320a>.

²⁶ <https://twitter.com/StZaryn/status/1520074475580100608>.

²⁷ <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/78365/>.

Additional coverage by Kremlin aligned news networks attempted to further escalate tensions in Moldova-Transnistria. These efforts have been promoted through twisting or decontextualizing real events or comments by Ukraine. For example, on 12 March Sputnik Moldova shared a clip of Odessa's mayor, Gennadiy Trukhanov, at a press conference²⁸.

The mayor's speech is edited to state that he believed Russia will push through southern Ukraine to Transnistria. In its post, Sputnik framed this as a threat from the Ukrainian military to draw Moldova into the war.




Figure 13: A screenshot from 29 April of a Sputnik Moldova Telegram post showing the mayor of Odessa edited to claim that Russia will push through southern Ukraine to Transnistria.

²⁸ <https://t.me/rusputnikmd/20037>.

In another example, on 5 April Russian state media Sputnik posted in its English-language Telegram channel about ‘another provocation against Moldova from Ukraine²⁹.’

The video was an update by a Ukrainian official, Sergei Borzov, the head of the Vinnytsia Regional State Administration. The Sputnik post pulled out one sentence from the interview, misleadingly framing it as a threat towards Transnistrians.




Figure 14: A Screenshot taken on 29 April of a post in Sputnik’s English-language Telegram channel, stoking tensions between Moldovans and Ukrainian refugees.

Efforts were also made to raise tensions in Moldova over the presence of Ukrainian refugees. This took place in early March in Russian and English as well as Moldovan, suggesting the intended audience was international.

The disinformation efforts were conducted largely on social media. At platforms such as Facebook, Telegram and TikTok.

²⁹ <https://t.me/sputnik/783>.

The posts asserted that Ukrainian refugees were behaving badly in Moldova including: “demand[ing] girls and louder music”, “making a mess and traveling in fancy cars”, implementing “language patrols” and harassing local Russian-speaking residents.




Figure 15: A screenshot taken on 29 April of a post warning about Ukrainian refugees in Moldova.³⁰



³⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/100017032865625/videos/530299068387801>.

Figure 16: A screenshot taken on 29 April of a post warning about the behaviour of Ukrainian refugees in Moldova.³¹




Figure 17: A screenshot taken on 29 April of a post warning about Ukrainian refugees.³²

³¹ <https://t.me/OpenUkraine/7881>.

³² <https://t.me/swodki/42621>.

3. Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage

Following its botched attempt to occupy Kyiv Oblast, the Russian military has been re-deploying across Ukraine. Since 20 April, Russian forces have been heavily targeting Mariupol's Azovstal factory.³³ Meanwhile, Russian forces have begun their offensive in Ukraine's Donbass region.

The goal of the Russian military is to fully capture and control the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions.³⁴

CIR has been continuously geolocating and verifying footage showing civilian casualties, infrastructure damage, and mass graves resulting from Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

This week with the escalation of tensions in Moldova-Transnistria, CIR has also been verifying footage emerging from Moldova-Transnistria of civilian infrastructure damage.

Infrastructure Damage in Moldova-Transnistria

Between 23 to 29 April there has been a significant escalation in tensions in Moldova-Transnistria, and near Ukraine's border with the region in Odessa Oblast.

On 23 April a Russian missile attack in Odesa hit a residential building causing multiple civilian casualties, amongst which was a young baby³⁵.


On 25 April, an attack took place on the Ministry of State Security in Tiraspol, Transnistria. While on 26 April, two radio transmission towers were destroyed because of a targeted attack in Transnistria. These incidents could be observed on the map below. EOR investigators have verified these via open-source methods.

³³ <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/28/europe/mariupol-azovstal-steel-plant-intl-cmd/index.html>.

³⁴ <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220417-zelensky-says-russia-aims-to-destroy-the-region-of-donbass-vows-to-defend-it>.

³⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61210699>.

Recent events in Transnistria



Created with Datawrapper

Figure 18: A map showing the locations of recent incidents across Transnistria.

Below are some examples of noted developments in Moldova-Transnistria that were verified and geolocated by CIR's investigators:

- On 27 April, a Russian ship was allegedly observed on the coast of Odesa.
- On 26 April an alleged Russian strike destroyed the Pidyomnyy bridge, in Odessa Oblast.
- On 26 April, several Radio transmission towers were damaged and destroyed in the town of Mocreachi, Transnistria, approximately 800 meters from the border with Ukraine.
- On 26 April, following the explosion of radio transmission towers, Russian peacekeeping forces established checkpoints in several locations across Transnistria.
- On 25 April, an attack took place targeting the Ministry of State Security using an RPG-22 AT and RPG-22 AT launcher as well as an RShG-1 thermobaric launcher, which were discovered at the scene.
- On April 23, a cruise missile hit a residential building in the city of Odesa, causing multiple casualties

Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage

Attacks on civilians, civilian buildings, and other infrastructure have continued to take place by Russian forces ([please see CIR map](#)).

Below are some notable examples that were verified and geolocated by CIR's investigators:

- On 29 April, [satellite imagery showed the formation of mass graves in Vynohradne cemetery, Donetsk Oblast](#).
- On 29 April, [satellite imagery showed large-scale residential destruction in Livoberezhnyi District, Mariupol](#).
- On 29 April, [satellite imagery showed large-scale destruction to Mariupol's train station and residential buildings nearby](#).
- On 29 April, [satellite imagery showed large-scale destruction of Mariupol's drama theatre and nearby residential areas](#).
- On 29 April, [satellite imagery showed large-scale industrial and residential destruction in and around the Azovstal factory in Mariupol](#).
- On 22 April 18km West of Mariupol, [satellite imagery showed signs of an increasing mass civilian grave](#).

Infrastructure Damage in Moldova-Transnistria



Figure 19: Images showing the aftermath of the attack, with the Ministry for State security³⁶ indicated in red; geolocated to 46.83882, 29.62218.




Figure 20: Multiple images from 26 April showing the damaged Radio transmission tower,³⁷ destroyed Radio transmission tower³⁸ and Russian peacekeeping forces at the scene³⁹; geolocated to 47.291124, 29.415840.

³⁶ <https://twitter.com/adrianpacurariu/status/1518623420174458880>.

³⁷ <https://twitter.com/ireneuszulesza/status/1518920399387611137>.

³⁸ <https://twitter.com/Marconie9192006/status/1518921855255683083>.

³⁹ https://twitter.com/MarQs_/status/1518907560509722624.




Figure 21: A map showing the location of the destroyed bridge in Odessa Oblast; geolocated to 46.076293, 30.470002.



Figure 22: Footage showing alleged Russian War Ships on the Coast of Odessa.

Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage



Figure 23: Satellite imagery taken on 1 May showing a heavily targeted Azovstal Plant in Mariupol; geolocated to 47.108469, 37.608435.⁴⁰



Figure 24: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April showing a heavily targeted Azovstal Plant in Mariupol; geolocated to 47.107, 37.606.⁴¹

⁴⁰ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1521472185205936129>.

⁴¹ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520543556129148928>.



Figure 25: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April showing a heavily targeted Azovstal Plant in Mariupol; geolocated to 47.107, 37.606.⁴²



Figure 26: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April showing the destruction of Mariupol Theater and destroyed buildings in its vicinity; geolocated to 47.095, 37.547.⁴³

⁴² <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520543556129148928>.

⁴³ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520543886548033542/photo/1>.




Figure 27: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April, showing wide scale residential destruction near Mariupol's train station; geolocated to 47.085, 37.555.⁴⁴



Figure 28: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April, showing heavy damage to residential buildings in Livoberezhnyi District; geolocated to 47.099, 37.628.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520544228035735553/photo/1>.

⁴⁵ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520544725228568576/photo/1>.



Figure 29: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April, of Vynohradne cemetery with self-propelled artillery deployed nearby; geolocated to 47.097, 37.714.⁴⁶



Figure 30: Satellite imagery taken on 29 April, of Vynohradne cemetery with self-propelled artillery deployed nearby; geolocated to 47.097, 37.714.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520544937913339907/photo/1>.

⁴⁷ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1520544937913339907/photo/2>.




Figure 31: A screenshot of satellite imagery taken between 19 March to 3 April of a cemetery near Mariupol; geolocated to 47.073233, 37.300564.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ <https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1517483300658442240>.

