Taliban Minister Khalil Haqqani killed in ISKP-claimed suicide attack

Taliban blames “foreign countries” for aiding ISKP amid rumours of internal tensions.

On 11 December 2024, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Refugee and Repatriation, uncle of Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, and a key figure in the Haqqani Network, was killed in an attack. The explosion, reportedly caused by a person-borne improvised device (PBIED), took place at his Ministry in Kabul after the afternoon prayer.

Reports suggest the attacker managed to pass through security at the ministry by claiming he had a metal rod in his arm and was therefore not properly checked when triggering the security gate. A photo circulating on social media purportedly shows the moment the alleged attacker passed through the gate. A sling is visible, supporting his right arm. An additional photo of the attacker prior to the blast showed him sitting on the prayer mat inside the building, as seen in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Image from CCTV showing the alleged attacker passing through security at the ministry (left), and sitting on the prayer mat inside the building, seemingly before the prayer (right).

According to Islamic State-affiliated media outlet Amaq Agency, the attacker was wearing an explosive vest. The use of a fake injury resembles the methodology of a previous ISKP-claimed attack in August 2022 which killed Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani, a prominent Hanafi scholar. In that incident, the attacker reportedly concealed explosives in his prosthetic leg, detonating himself close to the target.

Attack claimed by ISKP

ISKP claimed the assassination of Khalil Haqqani on the same day via Amaq News Agency, and Al Azaim, both ISKP-affiliated media outlets. The publication contained the photo of the attacker in front of the IS flag, with text that read: “A senior Taliban official and several of his aides were killed in a suicide attack by the Islamic State in Afghanistan.”

Amaq News Agency claimed that the attacker had entered the headquarters, passed through the security barriers undetected, and then waited for the moment Khalil Haqqani had left his office and then detonated the explosive vest on seeing the target, killing the minister as well as a number of his guards and administrative assistants.

AW noted that the attacker’s hand and forearm do not appear to be injured on the photo taken in front of the IS flag, supporting the claim that a fake injury was the method used to pass through security with explosives undetected.

Figure 2: Photo of the ISKP’s attacker with no injuries on his hand (left), and him sitting inside the building with cast on his arm after going through security (right).

Taliban officials’ quickly accuse ISKP, hint at Pakistan

Despite ISKP claiming the attack hours after it happened, it was notable that, in the immediate aftermath, Taliban officials had already sought to attribute the blame to ISKP. This was likely as an attempt to head off speculation that the attack was a result of internal Taliban rifts, a narrative that gained traction particularly among anti-Taliban figures keen to stoke internal tensions.

Taliban Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed Khalil Haqqani’s death and shared an official statement on X (formerly Twitter) with condolences from the Islamic Emirate on the occasion of the “martyrdom”. Mujahid mentioned that “the enemies of Islam allocated a reward” of USD 5,000,000 (GBP 3,956,322) to the person who killed him, possibly referring to the US Department of Justice’s reward for information on Haqqani. The statement also implied that the attack was organised by ISKP, stating that Haqqani was killed “by those Kharijites who claim Islam and deem other Muslims infidels”.

Condolences were also expressed by Khalid Zadran, the Kabul police spokesperson, on his X account, and Anas Haqqani, the nephew of Khalil, who claimed to Reuters that six other individuals were killed in the attack.

On 13 December 2024, various pro-Taliban social media users shared a video showing a speech of Taliban acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Mutaqqi at Khalil Haqqani’s funeral ceremony. The video showed the Minister accusing “neighbouring countries” of working with IS to plan attacks on Afghan soil, stating that, “IS has carried out seven attacks that resulted in casualties in the past seven months. Six of these attacks were planned outside Afghanistan”.

Although no specific country was mentioned in the speech, on 12 December 2024, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told Tolo News that investigations were still ongoing, although he also mentioned that previous attacks had been planned from alleged ISKP “safe havens” in the Mastung area of Balochistan, Pakistan. Pro-Taliban media outlets also consistently accuse Pakistan of collaborating with ISKP.

On 14 December 2024, Afghanistan International reported that the Taliban had arrested two employees from the Taliban Refugee Ministry in connection with the assassination of Khalil Rahman Haqqani. Although no further details were given about the individuals at the time of writing.

Early speculation around perpetrator: ISKP vs Taliban internal rifts

Despite ISKP claiming the attack within hours, speculation of intra-Taliban feuds still circulated on social media in the immediate aftermath of Khalil Haqqani’s assassination. Many observers, particularly anti-Taliban figures, claimed the killing was as a result of an internal power struggle between the Kandahari and the Haqqani Taliban, contextualising the attack within recent public comments that purportedly show emerging rifts between the two factions.

The speculation and theories of rifts continued even after ISKP’s claim was released, with some noting the dynamics and comments around the funeral of Khalil Haqqani on 12 December 2024. Speaking at the event, Sirajuddin Haqqani made remarks which reinforced suspicions among observers on the possible involvement of Taliban elements in Haqqani’s assassination, commenting: “We bear no personal grudge or enmity toward anyone and leave the matter of Khalil Rahman Haqqani’s revenge to Allah”.

According to Mirwais Afghan, an Afghan writer and journalist, no Taliban member from southern Afghanistan attended Haqqani’s funeral. AW has visually confirmed Mawlawi Abdul Kabeer, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Amir Khan Muttaqi, Shahabuddin Dilawar, Ibrahim Haqqani, Badruddin Haqqani, and several other non-Kandahari Taliban in attendance at the funeral. However, on 13 December 2024, Taliban and pro-Taliban accounts shared photos of Kandahari Taliban visiting Sirajuddin Haqqani for condolences in his house.

Remarks

Prominent pro-Taliban media influencers claimed that Khalil Haqqani’s son, Hafiz Ahmad Haqqani, has been appointed to replace his father. However, based on an unconfirmed report by Porana News, an Afghan news agency, the Supreme Leader has appointed Haji Yousuf Wafa, the current governor of Balkh, to succeed Khalil Haqqani as Refugee Minister. On 14 December 2024, Haji Zaid, the Taliban spokesperson for the Balkh governor, denied the reports on Haji Yousuf Wafa’s succession of Khalil Haqqani, saying the reports were baseless.

It is likely that anti-Taliban figures and media will continue to entertain theories around the killing of Haqqani, and look for more opportunities to highlight alleged splits and stoke rifts within the Taliban. The Taliban’s readiness to pin the blame on ISKP – even before a claim had been released – suggests they are keen to head off this narrative.

For ISKP, they have previously carried out and claimed successful attacks against ministries in Kabul, as well as senior officials, including governors. However, this attack represents the first successful operation targeting a cabinet-level Taliban minister, and prominent Haqqani Network figure. As such, it is a major victory for ISKP to claim publically, particularly given their significant operational decline in the country since early 2023.