Public protests against the Taliban in Kabul, Herat and Jowzjan provinces

Between 29 – 31 July 2024, AW recorded reports of three public protests in Kabul, Herat and Jowzjan provinces respectively (see figure one, below).

In Kabul, ex-civil servants protested against the non-payment of their pensions since the beginning of the Taliban’s current control of Afghanistan in 2021. In Herat, a protest of several dozen money exchangers took place outside the Herat Governor’s office, reportedly in response to the imposition of a licensing regime requiring them to pay between 6 and 6.6 million Afghanis (approximately 66,786 and 73,412 GBP) to the Central Bank in exchange for a licence to work.

Men’s protests are often driven by economic concerns, a trend previously identified by AW in 2023. However, the Jowzjan protest was reportedly against Taliban harassment of women, and took place in a village where a teenage girl had been reportedly abducted by Taliban members.

Money exchangers in Herat protest against new licence fees

With only an estimated 10 percent of adults in Afghanistan owning a bank account as of 2021, money exchangers provide an essential function in the Afghan economy. These individuals offer services as small, informal banks, providing small loans, trade of currency, and carrying out informal cash transfers. Additionally, their economic influence is substantial: in 2021, the BBC reported that an estimated 200,000 individuals work in exchange offices, compared to 10,000 in banks.

However, on 29 July 2024, 8AM Media posted a video on X (formerly Twitter), allegedly showing Taliban members closing down the Khorasan Market money exchange in Herat. Armed individuals are visible in the footage, and AW has verified the location as the Khorasan Market. The caption in the video alleges that “at least 500” money exchange shops in Herat were closed by the Taliban, with Etilaatroz also reporting this number, adding that the markets had been closed “due to not having a licence to operate.”

Then, on 30 July 2024, several media outlets posted footage on X reporting a large protest against the closures outside the Herat Governor’s office. The protest was substantial, with several dozen people visible outside the gates of what AW has verified as the governor’s office. Reports emerged later that day of the violent dispersal of the protest by Taliban members, with 8AM media claiming that, according to local sources, one individual had been arrested and another beaten, following separate protests in the “Shar Nou area and near the exchange markets.” AW was unable to verify these claims due to a lack of footage.

Several reports indicated that the closure of the markets was due to non-compliance with a law published on 11 July 2024, requiring a licence for trading, allegedly costing between 6 and 6.6 million Afghanis (approximately GBP 66,786 and 73,412) (Further reference to law here). One trader was quoted by 8AM media:

Both the law itself and local media indicate that a principal reason for the increased regulation of money exchanges is the prevention of currency smuggling from Afghanistan to abroad, which contributes to the devaluation of the Afghani. This issue has been a long-term concern for the Taliban de facto authorities, with a similar licensing measure attempted in May 2022 for the same reason, as well as an alleged intent to inhibit the funding of terrorist groups, facilitated by the money exchange system’s informal nature and lack of oversight. However, a previous strike by money exchangers prevented its implementation.

Similar to concerns in 2022, the main objection of the money exchangers appears to be the cost of the licence, rather than the principle of licensing itself, reinforcing the trend of economic factors as a substantial trigger behind protests among Afghan men. Given that the current licensing scheme costs one million Afghanis (approximately 11,133 GBP) more than the unsuccessful scheme of 2022, combined with the considerable influence of money exchangers in the Afghan economy, AW assesses that it is possible a compromise may be reached, but this remains to be seen.

Retired civil servants protest in Kabul against the non-payment of pensions

On 31 July 2024, Afghanistan International published a video showing a group of people protesting, allegedly in front of the Taliban’s Ministry of Finance in Kabul. According to the information provided, a number of retired former government employees were protesting against the non-payment of their pensions since the Taliban take-over in August 2021.

On 1 August 2024, a large number of retirees gathered in an undisclosed location to demand the payment of their pensions. The group talked to Tolo News, with one retiree saying:

According to the Tolo News report, the de facto authorities would not comment on the payment of pensions.

The issue of pensions payments is a long-standing issue under the Taliban’s current control of Afghanistan, in spite of continued objections, and leaves many elderly Afghans without financial security. Despite assurances by the Taliban’s Ministry of Finance in August 2022 that pensions would be paid “as soon as technical problems were resolved,” two years later, the situation remains unchanged.

In 2023, various pensioners had previously talked to news agencies, stating that they were “struggling to survive in the cold winter due to lack of financial resources.” The situation showed no improvement, and as of June 2024, around 150,000 pensioners, who were receiving a state pension before the beginning of the current Taliban control in August 2021, were reportedly still waiting for their pension.

In April 2024, both BBC and Azadi Radio published articles claiming that the Taliban leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, had ordered the Taliban Ministry of Finance to stop deducting pension contributions from civil servants, indicating a possible plan to completely dismantle the pension system in Afghanistan. 

According to Mohammad Amir Nouri, an economics professor interviewed by the BBC, the decision may be based on the opinion of some Taliban scholars who consider paying pensions to be against Sharia Law. The decision led to a protest in Kabul on 18 April 2024, in which demonstrators once again demanded the payment of their retirement pensions. No official resolution in response to the demonstrations in July and August 2024 has yet been observed.

Local residents in Jowzjan province protested against Taliban harassmen

On 29 July 2024, various news agencies and social media users reported a protest against local Taliban members in a village in Jowzjan province. According to the reports, residents of the village of Pasteh Mazar in the Darzab district protested against Taliban harassment of women.

A video shared online appeared to show the protest, consisting of various men and a few young boys outdoors. Although a number of civilians were seen shouting and gesticulating, no violence was observed directly from the crowd towards the nearby Taliban members. The footage also did not show the Taliban’s response towards the gathered population.

According to local sources contacted by Etilaatroz, the protest took place after Taliban forces reportedly attempted to enter people’s homes at night with the intention of sexually assaulting them. 

Natiq Malikzada, a journalist with over 40,000 followers, claimed that when local Pashtun Taliban members were relocated to the region in 2021, they forcibly seized the house of the former district police officer and turned it into a military base. Malikzada added that, according to local residents, a few days prior to the protest, Taliban members had forcibly dragged a teenage girl into the base, which led to a clash among members of the Taliban within the base, resulting in one alleged fatality. However, AW could not verify these claims.

Media sources reported that Taliban members shot and beat the protesters, killing one person and wounding four others. Shafaqna, an international Shiite news website, claimed that local sources identified the deceased as Mullah Abdul Rahman, a tribal elder in Darzab district. AW was not able to verify these claims due to a lack of visual evidence.

Remarks

The reports of recent demonstrations show that, as with protests reported in 2023, economic concerns and violations against women and girls remain significant drivers of public demonstrations. This is despite multiple reports of the Taliban’s use of violence to disperse such popular protests.

As a demographic, pensioners are unlikely to successfully instigate change to the Taliban’s economic policy regarding the payment of pensions. But the influence of money exchangers on the Afghan economy may mean that their objections to the licence payments are unlikely to be ignored by Taliban authorities.