Following the strikes, various other social media accounts, including news agencies, shared photos and videos showing numerous alleged casualties of the airstrikes, in their majority children.
Pakistani media reported that the airstrikes targeted, in addition to senior TTP commanders, the TTP’s central Umar Media hub, and a suicide bomber training facility, both of which were allegedly destroyed.
The reports claimed that approximately 70 militants were killed, including Umar Media’s head, Shoaib Iqbal Cheema (alias Chaudhry Muneeb ur Rehman Jutt) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGB, a TTP faction based in North Waziristan) commander Akhtar Muhammad Khalil.
However, independent sources (including OSINT sources and AW’s own contacts) have yet to confirm the deaths of these or any other commanders. Some notable observers, citing local sources in Barmal, refuted claims of the commanders’ deaths.
On 25 December, Umar Media released a video featuring Jutt, who denied his death and dismissed claims that any TTP or Umar Media facility had been targeted. Similarly, a spokesperson for the HGB group denied the death of any of its members, and reiterated Khorasani’s assertion that their fighters are based in Pakistan rather than Afghanistan.
Significantly, the airstrikes mark the first time that both the Pakistan military and the civilian government have formally accepted responsibility for targeting alleged TTP hideouts in Afghanistan, accompanied by threats of future action.
On 26 December, the spokesperson for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mumtaz Baloch, and on 27 December, the spokesperson for the armed forces, Major General Sharif Ahmed, each held separate press conferences where they acknowledged responsibility for the strikes. They characterised the operations as “precision intelligence-based” and presented them as part of Pakistan’s national defence strategy, while indicating their intent to continue such actions in the future.
Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Pakistani forces have now launched airstrikes against alleged TTP hideouts in Afghanistan on three separate occasions. The first took place in April 2022, when airstrikes targeted areas in Khost and Kunar provinces. Another round of airstrikes occurred in March 2024 in Khost and Barmal, targeting alleged TTP and HGB hideouts.
These operations reportedly resulted in civilian casualties, including women and children. However, no independent sources have been able to verify Pakistan’s claims to have killed prominent commanders in these strikes.
Response of the Afghan Taliban
The Taliban’s Ministry of Defence issued a statement on 24 December, immediately following the airstrikes, condemning the attacks. The statement asserted that Pakistan had targeted Afghan civilians and refugees from Waziristan in Barmal, and that the IEA had a “right to defend its territory”.
The following day, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Information Minister Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa strongly condemned the attacks, warning Pakistan to refrain from such aggression or “face the same consequences as the British, Soviet, and US-NATO forces that had previously invaded the country”. Muttaqi characterised the people and civilian leadership of Pakistan as friends of Afghanistan, attributing the escalating tensions to Pakistan’s military.
Khairkhwa emphasised that the Taliban would not interfere with the TTP since it is an internal matter for Pakistan, and that Afghan Taliban fighters had been explicitly instructed not to engage in conflict with Pakistan. He underscored that the Taliban are unwilling to compromise on the Afghan tradition of protecting guests, although without referring to the TTP. Instead, Khairkhwa claimed that the primary target of the attacks were Pakistani refugees from Waziristan.
On 25 December, the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Pakistan’s Chargé d’affaires in Kabul to formally issue a protest regarding the airstrikes.
Between the night of 27 and 28 December, Taliban forces reportedly targeted Pakistani forces in Kurram district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (bordering Khost and Paktia provinces). In an official statement, the Taliban Ministry of Defence described the targets as hideouts of “wicked elements” on Pakistani soil, likely a reference to ISKP. The Ministry, however, did not explicitly state that the attacks were in retaliation to the Barmal strikes.
AW notes that the Taliban leadership has responded in a more measured and comprehensive manner to the recent Paktia incident, unlike during past airstrikes.
After the March 2024 strikes, Taliban Minister of Defence Mullah Mohammad Yaqub Mujahid, dressed in a military uniform for the first time in public, assumed responsibility for subsequent retaliatory strikes against Pakistani forces. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid also issued an official condemnation, refuting Pakistani claims that TTP commander Abdullah Mehsud and other militants in Barmal had been killed.
After the most recent Paktia strikes, however, the Taliban have appeared careful not to present subsequent operations in Pakistan as retaliation. Rather, they were framed as mirroring Pakistan’s claims of targeting the armed opposition on the other side of the Durand Line.
AW observes that while the Taliban has consistently accused Pakistan of harbouring ISKP hideouts, they have not alleged their presence in Kurram to date. In September 2024, Taliban alleged that ISKP used hideouts and training camps in Pakistan’s Khyber district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Mastung district, Balochistan, to launch attacks into Afghanistan.
An aggressive shift from Pakistan
The initial airstrikes took place as Pakistan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Sadiq Khan, was in Kabul to meet the Taliban leadership. Despite Sadiq Khan’s visit, the airstrikes — combined with the civilian and military claims of responsibility — indicate a rise in Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions.
Pakistani security officials reportedly characterised the Barmal strikes as a response to the TTP’s attack in South Waziristan (bordering Pakitka) on 21 December 2024, which killed 16 military personnel and injured some eight others. AW assesses that Pakistan was likely signalling to the Taliban that if their attempts at dialogue with the TTP fail, Pakistan will not hesitate to take any necessary measures.
AW assesses that the Barmal strikes may signal the beginning of a more aggressive Pakistani approach to curb escalating TTP attacks, underscored by two other significant recent developments.
First, on 24 December, unidentified assailants wounded Abdul Wadood Shirzad, an Afghan employee at the Indian Consulate, in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province. An Indian official was also reportedly injured in the attack.
Notably, media outlets widely believed to be linked to Pakistani intelligence agencies (such as Markhor, Mahaz and Khyber Chronicles) reported on the incident, identifying Shirzad as the target and disseminating detailed information about him. These outlets characterised the incident as a significant blow to India’s purported covert intelligence network in Afghanistan, which allegedly involves financial support to the TTP on Afghan territory.
Similarly, on 3 December, TTP supporters accused Pakistan’s intelligence agencies of orchestrating the assassination of a senior commander, Shahid Umar Bajauri, along with two associates, in Kunar province. The celebratory tone and exclusive coverage of the incident by media outlets associated with Pakistani intelligence points to their likely involvement.
Disinformation following the airstrikes
Following the December 2024 airstrikes, two videos circulated online allegedly showing a TTP training camp in Afghanistan that had been targeted. Both videos were initially shared by accounts supportive of the Pakistani security forces.
The footage featured a person recording a scene with numerous individuals on the ground, a cloud of smoke, and small fires. The narrator described the location as “Mukhlis Yar camp” where dozens of “Mujahideen” were training prior to the strike.
One of the videos was further disseminated by the Afghan news agency Aamaj News, which claimed it showed the training centre in Paktika where several TTP commanders had been killed. In the following days, the same footage was shared by other social media accounts with large followings.
AW assesses that the footage is likely fabricated. None of the supposedly deceased individuals on the ground appear to even be injured, while their bodies are seemingly scattered randomly throughout the area, rather than in a pattern that would indicate the impact of a recent airstrike. There is no visible crater or debris near the individuals, just small fires which seem contained, all scattered randomly.
The person recording also very clearly and pointedly describes the alleged attack, referencing the name of the camp, the number of victims, specifying they were “Mujahideen” who were training when the airstrike happened. This level of detail is unusual in post-attack videos, indicating that the narrator was following a script.
On 28 December 2024, another X (formerly Twitter) account supportive of the Pakistan security forces, Kashmir Urdu with almost 63,000 followers, falsely claimed that “the Pakistan Army is taking temporary control of the Wakhan Corridor [a narrow strip of land in Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakshan province, connecting Afghanistan to China and bordering Pakistan] until the Afghan Taliban stops supporting the TTP” (Figure 2).
The claim was spread online by multiple accounts with large followings, even including Pakistani journalists.
