AW notes that such comments are part of a broader effort by NRF since the Trump election victory, as the group has increased its social media presence to target both US politicians and the Taliban. These campaigns seemingly focus on three areas: reinforcing anti-Taliban narratives centred on the international terrorism threat; presenting NRF as a potent anti-Taliban force; and disinformation promoting the notion of domestic support and appetite in the US for the NRF’s cause.
Reinforcing anti-Taliban narratives: The international terrorism threat from Afghanistan
On 6 November 2024, hours after Trump declared victory, Ali congratulated the President-elect on his triumph and expressed hope for a policy correction towards Afghanistan.
Ali’s post on X (formerly Twitter), addressing @realDonaldTrump, claimed that the Taliban and other global terrorist organisations have exploited the US policy of “appeasement” over the past four years to gain strength and resources. He called for an end to the US’s “weekly financial support to the Taliban” and asked for the new administration to support the “people’s resistance”.
Likewise, posts from Ali on 12 November 2024 addressed Waltz and Rubio, recalling their initiatives as Congressmen to pressure the Taliban and curb international terrorism. Ali noted that Rubio and Waltz were aware of the “threats posed by the Taliban reign” to Afghanistan.
Similarly, on 13 and 16 November 2024, Ali reposted a policy memo titled “The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan” and an analysis titled “Trump’s Chance to Atone for America’s Afghan Shame”, both by Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, a conservative US think-tank.
The policy memo, published in August 2024, discusses the dire situation in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Doha agreement, while proposing US formal engagement and support for NRF. The analysis piece, published in November 2024, stresses how missteps by the US administration have led to a resurgence of transnational terrorist organisations in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.
Coffey again suggests that the incoming Trump administration should “recalibrate” and “reengage” anti-Taliban forces, naming NRF in particular. Ali’s posts further call on the Trump national security team to take “decisive” action against the increasing terrorism threat from Afghanistan.
Similarly, multiple other NRF-affiliated accounts also warned against the growing threat of terrorism from Afghanistan since the US election.
Showcasing NRF’s strength and presence
In November 2024, many NRF-affiliated accounts on X, posting in English, increased posts focused on showcasing NRF’s military strength and presence in Afghanistan. These accounts also include some of the US-based NRF lobbyists with closer ties to American veterans and currently serving military officers.
On 23 November 2024, the account @WeAreNRF posted a video with maps and graphics, showcasing NRF attacks between 22 October and 20 November 2024. The same video first appeared on the official NRF account on the same day, claiming that NRF had carried out 41 attacks in 11 provinces, killing and injuring 115 Taliban members.
AW notes that this is the first time the NRF has posted graphics to highlight its operations; the group previously used plain text format. This visual style is likely meant to attract more attention online.
