Russian motivations
AW analysts believe that there are several plausible explanations for Russia’s courting of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In some ways, this engagement echoes the USSR’s New Eastern Politics, which sought improved relations with non-aligned Muslim countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia in the 1960s and 1970s during the Cold War. Russia then sought to shore up symbolic and material support from these states, in particular where anti-Western sentiment dominated among political elites.
At recent Kremlin-arranged international events in 2024, such as the Kazan Forum and more notably the St Petersburg Economic Forum, the Taliban delegation found itself grouped with other Latin American and African delegates (Bolivian, Venezuelan, Zimbabwean) as one of the countries that had experienced military occupation by Western forces, to the detriment of its economy.
Another Russian consideration is likely the still largely untapped natural resources of Afghanistan, estimated to be worth some USD 1 trillion. The latest study of Afghanistan’s deposits of 2021 lists some of the world’s most valuable commodities, including precious and rare earth metals, as well as gems and semi-precious stones.
Security implications in Central Asia
While three out of the five republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan) have accepted the credentials of Taliban envoys or delisted the group as terrorists, AW estimates that there are remaining regional security concerns associated with delisting the Taliban in Russia.
While the Afghan Taliban may have abandoned the idea of invading Tajikistan and overthrowing President Emomali Rahmon, their Tajik allies, the Islamic Emirate of Tajikistan (formerly Ansarullah) has never disavowed their antagonism against the secular government of Tajikistan, and continues to promote jihad against Tajikistan in its propaganda.